爱尔兰威克洛论文代写：企业社会责任
在管理领域最重要的沟通来源是披露和财务报告，包括管理会计以及财务会计。通过一个组织的财务报告，管理有助于为决策者提供支持。决策者已被发现在一些与利益相关者的群体中。从组织的披露是至关重要的资本运作的市场，以有效的方式（Weber，2008）。披露是已知的，是采取了一些不同的形式，并已被确定为报告的企业社会责任。如果组织参与企业社会责任的活动，它是相关的考虑，组织与利益相关者进行沟通，因为这是更经常是一个显着的方式达到合法性之间的利益相关者。除此之外，发明家都是相关的。在企业社会责任报告，组织可以有多个业务的背景下，不同的风险意识（布基斯特2005）。财务会计和管理会计的要求以及企业社会责任报告是有关委托代理和信息不对称的冲突的结果。这是已知的涉及管理以及利益相关者，因为这些往往有一些差异化的激励机制。如上所述，这与事实上，有一个存在的信息不对称的利益相关者和组织之间的帮助下，该组织成为能够在公司的信息优势。这种现象的结果对这一事实，市场将不会作为产品或企业不能被认为是好还是坏（巴罗等人。2012）。这被称为“柠檬”的问题。
利益相关者价值组织的基础上，他们自己的个人信息。如果坏的或好的公司或想法的分离不能由利益相关者做，它将导致某些好的组织将得到较少的价值和一些不好的组织将被给予更多的价值。坏的和良好的组织将在一个水平，是平均值。解决问题的柠檬是信息中介机构和法规，和最佳类型的合同。由组织产生的自愿报告和财务报告在决策过程中是相关的，一些不同的利益相关者，并已被确定为减少信息不对称的一种方法（程等人。2014）。因此，在这种情况下，可以有适用性的委托代理理论。由利益相关者组成的社会，是从利益相关者和校长的利益分配的管理者。
爱尔兰威克洛论文代写：企业社会责任
The most important source of communication in the field of management is disclosure and financial reporting that includes management accounting as well as financial accounting. Through the reports of finance of an organization, the management contributes in providing support for the makers of decision. The makers of decision have been found in a number of groups related to stakeholders. Disclosures from the organizations are critical for the market of capital functioning in an efficient manner (Weber, 2008). The disclosures are known to be taking a number of different forms and one has been identified as the reporting of CSR. If the organizations are involved in the activities of CSR, it is relevant to consider that the organizations for communicating this with the stakeholders, as this is more often a significant way for reaching legitimacy amongst the stakeholders. In addition to this, inventors are relevant. In the reporting of CSR, the organization can be showing that there is awareness for a number of varying risks in the context of business (Blomquist 2005). The requirement for financial accounting and management accounting along with the reporting of CSR is an outcome of conflicts related to principal agents and information asymmetry. This is known to involve management as well as stakeholders, as these often have a number of differentiated incentives. As mentioned above, this links with the fact that there is an existence of information asymmetry amongst the stakeholders and organization with the help of which the organization becomes capable of earning information advantage in the firm. This particular phenomenon results towards the fact that market will not be functioning as products or firms cannot be considered as being bad or good (Ballou et al. 2012). This is referred to as the problem of “lemons”.
Stakeholders value organizations on the basis of their own individual information. If separation of the bad or good firms or ideas cannot be done by the stakeholders, it will result in that certain good organizations will be given less value and some organizations that are bad will be given more value. Both the bad and good organizations will be given value at a level that is average. Solution to the issue of lemons are information intermediaries and regulations, and optimal types of contracts. The voluntary reports and financial reports produced by the organizations are relevant in the process of decision making for a number of different stakeholders, and has been identified as one way for the reduction of information asymmetry (Cheng et al. 2014). Hence, in this context there can be applicability of the principal agent theory. Society that consists of stakeholders, is the managers that act on assignment being received from stakeholders and the principals.
