加拿大坎卢普斯论文代写:债务
最高法院之前的问题是债务，这些债务是伙伴关系的或不。一个前临时决定已经由Chesterman J.，在那里他驳回申请提出由Smits也授予在赔偿费用。按Chesterman J.，Ogle先生在讨论土地的所有者；他也是适当的登记车主和老板的土地。这一事实并没有告诉该伙伴关系，以及与布朗先生没有共享。作为一个结果，他说，土地原来是信任Ogle先生关于合伙的目的。（austlii，2012）
事实，Chesterman J认为包括有研究发现已经有书面协议，导致合伙企业解散的，马上取消申请人/被告人的所有权利和义务对合伙的债权人。（austlii，2012）
考虑的各种原则是：
•合伙法–是该法案的41节的规定，合伙企业解散后，结合公司的每一个合作伙伴机构以及其他合作伙伴的权利和义务进行在伙伴关系的范围内，为结束合伙事务以及完成未完成的交易的时候，合伙企业解散的解散是必要的但却不如此。”（austlii，2012）
•当时债务转让了tendiris然后Smits，如果布朗是一个所谓的债务人没有注意到向他提供关于分配，作为1974物权法199条规定是必要的（QLD）。最终，它被认为是给布朗的分配下，史密特起诉缺陷分配通知失败（austlii，2012）。
按照我对合伙法的知识，我同意法院的决定，因为在合伙企业已经终止的时候，债务实际上已经发生了。在其终止后，以前的合作伙伴不承担任何此类债务。此外，Ogle先生从来没有把所有这一切都在关注布朗先生或合伙。此外，合伙的结算在终止合伙关系的时候完成，而不是在这里。
加拿大坎卢普斯论文代写:债务
The issue before the Supreme Court was over debts, about these debts being those of partnership or not. An ex-tempore decision has been given by Chesterman J., where he dismissed the application put forward by Smits and also awarded costs on an indemnity. As per Chesterman J., Mr Ogle was the owner of the land in the discussion; he was also the appropriately registered owner and keeper of the land. This fact was not told to the partnership, as well as was not shared with Mr. Brown as well. As a result, he said that the land turns out to be in trust by Mr Ogle with regards to partnership purposes. (Austlii, 2012)
The facts that Chesterman J considered include the finding there has been a written agreement, which resulted in the dissolution of the partnership and which right away abrogated all the rights of the applicant/defendant as well as their obligations concerning the partnership’s creditors. (Austlii, 2012)
The various principles considered are:
• The Partnership Act – It is stated in the section 41 of the act that subsequent to the partnership being dissolved, every partner’s authority of binding the firm as well as the partner’s other obligations and rights carry on in spite of the dissolution of the partnership to the extent that it is essential for winding up the partnership’s affairs as well as to complete the unfinished transactions at the time that the partnership is dissolved, however not otherwise.” (Austlii, 2012)
• At the time that the assignment of debt was done to Tendiris and then to Smits, in case Brown was an alleged debtor there was no notice provided to him about the assignment, as is necessary to be provided under section 199 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld). Eventually, it was considered that such failure of giving assignment’s notice to Brown made the assignment under which Smits sued defective (Austlii, 2012).
In accordance with my knowledge of the partnership law, I agree with the decision of the court, because the debt actually incurred at the time that the partnership was already terminated. After its termination, the previous partners are not liable for any of such debts. In addition, Mr. Ogle never brought all of this in attention to Mr. Brown or the partnership. Additionally, the settlement of partnership is done at the time of termination of the partnership, which was not the case here.
