代写：委托代理
Jensen和Meekling(1976)从另一个角度评价了Alchian和Demsetz理论。他们认为在两种权利分离的条件下，由于经理不是公司的所有者，经理可能承担所有的成本，只获得部分利润。当管理者招致额外收入的消耗时，他会得到所有的收益，只承担一小部分成本。结果将导致经理们对额外支出感兴趣，而不是工作。在这种情况下，公司的价值将小于所有者管理者的价值。两者之间的差异被称为“代理成本”，以解决代理成本问题，这使得管理者有充分的剩余利益。
代写：委托代理
Spenee和Zeekilauser(1971)、Ross(1973)、Grossman和Hart(1983)也发展了委托代理理论。他们发现，委托人希望代理人按照委托人的利益行事，但是委托人不能直接观察代理人的选择行为。主体可以观察一些由代理决定的变量。由于这些假设，代理人可能会追求自己的利益，与被称为“道德风险”的委托人的利益发生冲突。因此，主要的问题是如何根据可变的激励因素来观察，从而激励代理人采取有利于委托人的行动。换句话说，激励问题的核心是，在委托与代理的框架下寻求最优的激励方案。委托代理理论极大地改善了基金经理与投资者之间的关系。由于委托代理理论是研究信息不对称行为的理论基础，是研究基金经理激励的主要理论基础。
代写：委托代理
Jensen and Meekling (1976) from another point of view assessed the Alchian and Demsetz theory. They argue that under the conditions of separation of two rights, since the manager is not the owner of the firm, results of manager that he might bear all costs and only get part of the profits. When manager incur the consumption of additional revenue, he then gets all the benefits and bears only a small part of the cost. The results will lead to managers interested in additional spending, not to work. In such cases, the value of the firm will be less than the value of the owner-manager. The difference between the two is called “agency costs” to address the agency cost, which leads way to let managers have full residual interest.
代写：委托代理
Spenee and Zeekilauser (1971), Ross (1973) and Grossman and Hart (1983) also developed the principal-agent theory. They found that principals want an agent to act in accordance with the interests of the principals, but the principals cannot directly observe the agent choosing action. The principals can observe some variables that are decided by agents. Because of these assumptions, agents may pursue their own interests and conflict with interests of the principal called ‘moral hazard’. Thus, the principal concern is how that can be observed based on variable incentive agents to motivate agents to take action in favour of the principals. In other words, the core of the incentive problem, that is, in the framework of principal and agent seek optimal incentive programs. The principal-agent theory has greatly improved people’s relationship between fund managers and investors. Due to the principal-agent theory being under the study of the behaviour of asymmetric information, it is the main theoretical basis for research fund manager incentives.
