这种担忧背后的原因通常是，组织的绩效与组织内雇佣的管理人员的薪酬无关。管理者的偏好是包括各种各样的便利和奢侈，而不是与股东分享组织的利润(Daskalakis et al.， 2008)。因此，股东面临的首要问题是确保管理者工作背后的目标是组织价值的最大化和资源浪费的最小化。股东必须不断寻找解决委托代理问题的方法。
在第一个发展起来的代理理论中，Berle and Means(1932)认为，由于股权的减少，大组织的控制权和所有权之间的差距增大。这种情况特别为管理者提供了这样的选择，即他们追求的是自己的利益，而不是增加股东的回报(DeAngelo et al.， 1980)。只有所有者公司的股东和最高管理层的责任应该是确保股东的利益得到满足(Bancel和Mittoo, 2004)。
This can be considered the only option to minimize the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) and the costs of financing. This will enable the organization to increase the corporate performance as well as the value of the firm. It is found by many researchers that most organizations do not actually attain the optimal capital structure, while the top management of organization using theoretical models to calculate the structure of capital which is optimal.
The cause behind this concern in general is that the organization’s performance is not associated with the compensation of the employed managers within the organization. Preferences of the managers are to involve all kind of amenities and luxury instead of sharing the profits of the organization with the shareholders (Daskalakis et al., 2008). Hence, the primary issue faced by the shareholders is to ensure that objective behind the work of manager is maximization of the organization’s value and to minimize resource wastage. Shareholders constantly have to find a solution to face the problem of principal-agent.
In the firstly developed theory of agency, Berle and Means (1932) argued that gap is increased between the large organization’s control and ownership due to equity being decreased. This situation in particular offers such option to the managers that instead of increasing shareholders’ returns, their own interest is pursued (DeAngelo et al., 1980). Only owner’s company shareholders and the top management’s responsibility should be to make sure that interests of the shareholders are being met (Bancel and Mittoo, 2004).
Therefore, the top managers’ duty is to operate the organization in such manner that shareholder’s returns are increased with maximized cash flows and profit figures. However, it is explained by Jensen and Meckling (1976) that the organization’s managers not always operate it to increase the shareholder’s returns. These explanations resulted in development of the agency theory and the problem of principal-agent was signified as the primary determining factor of the organization’s performance.